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Abstract
Economists have offered many theories for the U.S. Great Depression, but no
consensus has formed on the main forces behind it. Here we describe and
demonstrate a simple methodology for determining which theories are the most
promising. We show that a large class of models, including models with various
frictions, are equivalent to a prototype growth model with time-varying effi-
ciency, labor, and investment wedges that, at least on face value, look like time-
varying productivity, labor taxes, and investment taxes. We use U.S. data to
measure these wedges, feed them back into the prototype growth model, and
assess the fraction of the ﬂuctuations in 1929–39 that they account for. We ﬁnd
that the efficiency and labor wedges account for essentially all of the decline
and subsequent recovery. Investment wedges play, at best, a minor role. This
article originally appeared in the American Economic Review. © American Eco-
nomic Association.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The Great Depression is not yet well understood. Econo-
mists have offered many theories for both the massive de-
cline and the slow recovery of output during 1929–39, but
no consensus has formed on the main forces behind this
major economic event. Here we describe and demonstrate
a simple methodology for determining which types of the-
ories are the most promising.
Several prominent theories blame the Great Depression
on frictions in labor and capital markets. The sticky wage
theory is that wage stickiness together with a monetary
contraction produces a downturn in output. (See Bordo,
Erceg, and Evans 2000.) The cartelization theory is that an
increase in cartelization and unionization leads to a slow
recovery. (See Cole and Ohanian 2001.) The investment
friction theory is that monetary contractions increase fric-
tions in capital markets that produce investment-driven
downturns in output. (See Bernanke and Gertler 1989,
Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997.) We think the critical feature
of both the sticky wage and cartelization theories is that
their frictions lead to a wedge between the marginal rate of
substitutionbetweenleisureandconsumptionandthemar-
ginal product of labor. The critical feature of the invest-
ment friction theory is that capital market frictions intro-
duce a wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in consumption and the marginal product of
capital.
We show that the aggregate properties of a class of
models with sticky wages and with cartels or unions are
the same as those of a growth model with suitably con-
structed taxes on labor. We also show that a class of mod-
els with investment frictions is equivalent in terms of
aggregate properties to a growth model with suitably con-
structed taxes on investment. We then consider an input
friction theory in which frictions in ﬁnancing inputs lead
to a wedge between aggregate inputs and outputs. Such
models have the same aggregate properties as a growth
modelwithsuitablyconstructedproductivity.(SeeBergoe-
ing, Kehoe, and Kehoe 2002 for other frictions that show
up as time-varying productivity.) These observations lead
us to conclude that a large class of business cycle models
are equivalent to a prototype growth model with time-
varying wedges that, at least at face value, look like time-
varyinglabortaxes,investmenttaxes,andproductivity.We
refer to these wedges as labor wedges, investment wedges,
and efficiency wedges.
These equivalence results lead us to propose a method
for accounting for economic ﬂuctuations in general: busi-
ness cycle accounting. We ﬁrst use a parameterized proto-
type growth model to measure in the U.S. data the wedges
we have identiﬁed.† We then feed the values of these
wedges back into the growth model to conduct our ac-
counting exercise, namely, to assess what fraction of the
output movements can be attributed to each wedge sepa-
rately and in combination. (In a deterministic model, by
construction, all three wedges account for all of the ob-
served movements in output.)
The goal of this business cycle accounting is to guide
researchers to focus on developing detailed models with
the kinds of frictions that can deliver the quantitatively
relevant types of observed wedges in the prototype econ-
omy. For example, both the sticky wage and cartelization
theories are promising explanations of the observed labor
wedges, while the simplest models of capital market fric-
tions are not. Theorists attempting to develop models of
particular channels through which shocks cause large ﬂuc-
tuations in output will beneﬁt from asking whether those
channelsareconsistentwiththeﬂuctuationsinwedgesthat
we document.
Our accounting yields clear results for the Great De-
pression: Almost all of the decline in output from 1929 to
1933 is due to a combination of efficiency wedges and
labor wedges, while much of the slow recovery from 1933
to 1939 is due to labor wedges alone. Investment wedges
play, at best, a minor role in the decline and recovery.
Whilenumeroustheoriesleadtolaborwedges,relative-
ly few lead to efficiency wedges. We ﬁnd it uninteresting
to view the efficiency wedge as emanating from a loss of
knowledge or a decline in the quality of blueprints. Rath-
er, we think the observed movements in measured pro-
ductivity are the results of poor government policies inter-
acting with shocks. These policies turn what otherwise
would be modest downturns into prolonged depressions.
Developing models with these properties is the key to un-
locking the mysteries of the Great Depression.
Equivalence Results
Here we show how various models with underlying dis-
tortions map into a prototype economy with one or more
wedges. We choose simple models to illustrate this map-
ping. Since many models map into the same conﬁguration
of wedges, identifying one particular conﬁguration does
not uniquely identify a model; rather, it identiﬁes a whole
class of models consistent with that conﬁguration. In this
sense, our method does not uniquely determine the most
promising model; rather it guides researchers to focus on
the key margins that need to be distorted.
The Prototype Economy
The prototype economy is a growth model with three sto-
chastic variables: At, τlt, and τxt. Using standard notation,
we say that in any period t, consumers maximize expected
utility over consumption ct and labor lt,E t∑tβ
tU(ct,lt), sub-
ject to the economy’s budget constraint:
(1) ct +( 1 + τxt)[kt+1 −( 1 − δ)kt]=( 1 − τlt)wtlt + rtkt + Tt
where kt is the capital stock; wt, the wage rate; rt, the rent-
al rate on capital; β
t, the discount factor; δ, the deprecia-
tion rate of capital; and Tt, lump-sum taxes; τxt and τlt are
the tax rates on investment and labor, respectively. The
ﬁrms’ production function is F(kt,lt), their productivity is
At, and their aggregate output is yt. Firms maximize
AtF(kt,lt)−rtkt − wtlt. The equilibrium is summarized by
the resource constraint, ct + kt+1 = yt +( 1 − δ)kt, together
with
(2) yt = AtF(kt,lt)
(3) −Ult/Uct =( 1 − τlt)AtFlt
(4) (1+τxt)Uct = βEtUct+1[At+1Fkt+1 + (1+τxt+1)(1−δ)].
We call At the efficiency wedge, 1−τlt the labor wedge,
and 1/(1+τxt) the investment wedge.
Efficiency Wedges
Our input friction theory has a simple deterministic econ-
omy with ﬁnancing frictions that lead to distortions in theallocation of inputs across two types of ﬁrms. Before
ﬁrms can produce, both types must borrow to pay for an
input, say, labor. Firms of the ﬁrst type, located in sector
1, are ﬁnancially constrained in that they must pay a
higher price for borrowing than do ﬁrms of the second
type, located in sector 2. We think of these frictions as
capturing the idea that some ﬁrms, which can be thought
of as small, ﬁnd borrowing harder than others do. One
source of the higher price paid by the ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms is that moral hazard problems are more
severe for small ﬁrms. (While this theory is reminiscent
of that of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the margins that
get distorted in our model and in theirs are quite differ-
ent.)
In each period t, ﬁrms borrow at the beginning of the
period to ﬁnance inputs and repay their loans at the end
of the period. Final output yt is produced from the outputs
















γ − p1ty1t − p2ty2t, where pit is the price of the output
of sector i. Firms in sector i hire labor lit to produce out-
put according to yit = l
α
it and maximize pitl
α
it − Ritwtlit,
where wt is the wage rate and Rit is the gross interest rate
paid on loans by ﬁrms in sector i. We imagine that ﬁrms
in sector 1 are more ﬁnancially constrained than those in
sector 2, so that R1t > R2t. Let Rit = Rt(1+τit), where Rt is
the rate savers earn and τit measures the difference, in-
duced by ﬁnancing constraints, between the rate paid to
savers and the rate paid by borrowers in sector i. Since
savers do not discount utility within the period, Rt =1 .




tU(ct,lt) subject to ct = wtlt + Πt, where Πt is
the period t proﬁts earned by ﬁrms. The resource con-
straints are lt = l1t + l2t and ct = yt.
We specialize our prototype economy to have a ﬁxed
capital stock normalized to 1 and consider any period. In
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002a, we prove the follow-
ing:
PROPOSITION 1. The equilibrium allocations for an econ-
omy with input ﬁnancing frictions coincide with those of
the prototype economy with efficiency wedge At and labor
wedge 1−τlt, where






(6) 1 − τlt =[ γ/(1+τ1t)] + [(1−γ)/(1+τ2t)].
Suppose that the ﬂuctuations in the underlying distor-
tions τ1t and τ2t are such that the constructed wedge 1 −
τlt is constant. That is, on average, ﬁnancing frictions are
unchanged, but relative frictions ﬂuctuate. An outside ob-
server using a one-sector growth model to ﬁt the data gen-
erated by the economy with input ﬁnancing frictions
would identify the ﬂuctuations in relative distortions with
ﬂuctuations in technology and would see no ﬂuctuations
in the labor tax rate. In particular, periods in which the
relative distortions increase would be misinterpreted as pe-
riods of technological regress. We thus want a more neu-
tral label than “technology” for At. We instead call it the
efficiency wedge since it is a simple measure of aggregate
production efficiency.
More generally, ﬂuctuations in the input ﬁnancing
wedges τ1t and τ2t, which lead to ﬂuctuations in τlt, show
up in the prototype economy as ﬂuctuations in both the ef-
ﬁciency wedge At and the labor wedge 1 − τlt.
Labor Wedges
Now consider two economies that give rise to labor wedg-
es. In one, wages are sticky, so that ﬂuctuations in mone-
tary policy induce ﬂuctuations in output. In the other,
unions have monopoly power, so that ﬂuctuations in the
government’s pro-competitive policies toward unions in-
duce ﬂuctuations in output.
Consider a sticky wage economy with utility function







uated at the equilibrium of this economy. In Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan 2002a, we prove the following:
PROPOSITION 2. The aggregate allocations in a prototype
economy with taxes on labor income given by







coincide with those of the sticky wage economy.
We call the constructed labor tax rate 1 − τlt the labor
wedge. This wedge reﬂects the gap between the marginal
product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween leisure and consumption in the intratemporal ﬁrst-
order condition for labor. An outside observer using the
prototype economy to ﬁt the data of the sticky wage econ-
omy would interpret output ﬂuctuations which arise from
ﬂuctuations in monetary policy as arising from ﬂuctua-
tions in labor wedges.
An exactly analogous proposition holds for an econ-
omy with monopoly unions. An outside observer of a
unionized economy would interpret output ﬂuctuations
arising fromﬂuctuations inthegovernment’spro-competi-
tive policies as arising from ﬂuctuations in labor wedges.
Investment Wedges
For investment frictions, the link between the original
economy and a prototype economy is immediate. Many of
the frictions discussed in the literature end up affecting the
economy by raising the ﬁrms’ cost of investment, from 1
to 1 + τxt. These show up in the prototype economy as an
investment wedge, a gap between the intertemporal mar-
ginal rate of substitution in consumption and the marginal
product of capital in (4).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and others have pointed
to agency costs as the source of investment distortions.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) embed the frictions studied
by Bernanke and Gertler into a standard growth model. In
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002a, we ﬁnd, as Carl-
strom and Fuerst do, that the Carlstrom-Fuerst model is
equivalent to the prototype growth model with investment
wedges and adjustment costs in investment. Most interest-
ing, we think, is that the equivalent prototype model has
neither efficiency wedges nor labor wedges.
Business Cycle Accounting
Now we try to measure our three wedges and determine
how much of actual U.S. output ﬂuctuations they can ac-
count for. (For details underlying this section, see Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002b.)Given data on yt,k t,l t, and ct, we use equations (2)–
(4) to construct series for efficiency and labor wedges. In
Chart 1 we display real detrended output, the detrended ef-
ﬁciency wedge, and the labor wedge. All the series are
normalized to equal 100 in 1929. As is clear in Chart 1,
output is 35 percent below trend in 1933 and is still 20
percent below trend by 1939. In 1933, the efficiency
wedge is 17 percent below its 1929 level, but by 1939 it
has essentially recovered. In 1933, the labor wedge is 28
percent lower than its 1929 level, and in 1939 it is still
that low. Thus, the underlying distortions that manifested
themselves as efficiency and labor wedges became sub-
stantially worse from 1929 to 1933. By 1939, the efficien-
cy wedge had disappeared, but the labor wedge remained
as large as it had been in 1933.
If we assume no uncertainty, we can use equation (4)
to measure the investment wedge as well. With that as-
sumption, however, we ﬁnd that 1/(1+τxt) is higher than
its 1929 level throughout the 1930s: according to this
measurement, the underlying distortions that manifested
themselves as investment wedges actually diminished in
the Great Depression. This conclusion is not plausible;
hence, we will propose an alternative method for assessing
investment wedges.
The Prototype Economy With
Efficiency and Labor Wedges . . .
First, we ask, What fraction of output ﬂuctuations can be
accounted for by the efficiency and labor wedges? We an-
swer this question by simulating our prototype economy
with our measured wedges and comparing the result to
actual U.S. data. We ﬁnd that together these wedges can
account for essentially all of the ﬂuctuations in U.S. out-
put between 1929 and 1939.
We start by independently inserting the series for each
of the two wedges into the prototype model and setting
the other wedges to their 1929 levels. We assume con-
sumers believe that in each year from 1930 through 1932
it is equally likely that, in the following year, the wedges
will stay at their current levels, revert to the 1929 levels,
or take on the values in the data. From 1933 on, we as-
sume perfect foresight.
With the efficiency wedge alone, the prototype econo-
my generates much of the observed downturn in output,
but much too rapid a recovery. As can be seen in Chart 2,
for example, by 1933 output falls about 26 percent in the
model and about 35 percent in the data. By 1939, the ef-
ﬁciency wedge model generates an output decline of only
6 percent rather than the observed 20 percent. As can also
be seen in Chart 2, the reason for this rapid recovery is
that the efficiency wedge model completely misses the
continued sluggishness in labor from 1933 onward. For
investment, this model shows a similar fall as in the data
from 1929 to 1933, but a faster recovery. (Here and
throughout,laborispercapitamanhours,whileinvestment
is detrended and normalized by output in 1929.)
In our model with only labor wedges, output falls only
about half as much by 1933 as output actually fell: 17
percent vs. 35 percent. By 1939, output in both this model
and the data have fallen about 20 percent. The labor
wedge model misses the sharp decline in investment from
1929 to 1933, but it does generate the sluggishness in la-
bor input after 1933.
These observations suggest investigating a prototype
economy with both efficiency and labor wedges. We thus
simulate an economy with our constructed series for these
two wedges with the investment wedge set to its 1929
level. Chart 3 shows that the resulting model captures
both the downturn in output and the slow recovery re-
markably well. It also generates the sluggishness in labor
after 1933 and does reasonably well on investment.
. . . And With an Investment Wedge
What fraction of output ﬂuctuations can be accounted for
by the investment wedge? Our difficulties in inferring a
reasonable level of that wedge from the U.S. data make us
wary of trying to answer this question by simply putting
in the wedge 1/(1+τxt) inferred from a deterministic ver-
sion of equation (4). Instead, we consider a prototype
economy with the efficiency and labor wedges set to their
1929 levels and let the investment wedge be whatever it
must be in order for the model to generate the actual in-
vestment series. In a sense, by attributing all movements
in investment to this wedge, we are overstating its con-
tribution to output ﬂuctuations.
In Chart 4, we see that the prototype economy with an
investment wedge generates only a modest fall in output
from 1929 to 1933 and does not generate the recovery af-
ter 1933. While this economy does generate a recovery in
labor, the effect on output is offset because the capital
stock is lower due to the cumulative effect of the decade-
long investment slump.
Conclusion
Our business cycle accounting suggests that research on
the Great Depression should focus on building detailed
models with underlying distortions that produce efficiency
and labor wedges. Building models of investment wedges
is not likely to yield a high payoff.
*This article is reprinted, with permission, from the American Economic Review
(May 2002, vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 22–27). © 2002 by the American Economic Associa-
tion. The article was edited for publication in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review.
The authors thank the National Science Foundation for ﬁnancial support. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the FederalReserve System. The basic data, computer
codes, and a detailed technical appendix for this study are available at http://
www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp619.html or, more directly, at ftp://ftp.mpls.
frb.fed.us/pub/research/mcgrattan/wp619/.
†Mulligan (2002) measures the labor wedge in the Great Depression, as we do,
and provides a variety of interpretations of this wedge, including those we do.
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Actual U.S. Output and Two Measured Wedges
Percentage of Each Series' Value in 1929; Annually, 1929–39







Sources of basic data: U.S. Commerce, various dates and 1975; Kendrick 1961
U.S. Output Labor Wedge
Efficiency WedgeCharts 2 and 3
Model Predictions With Efficiency and Labor Wedges
Per Capita Output, Labor, and Investment; Annually, 1929–39*











































*The output and investment series are detrended by 1.6 pecent per year.
 The output and labor series are shown relative to their 1929 values (1929=100);
 the investment series, as a percentage of 1929 output.
 Sources of basic data: U.S. Commerce, various dates and 1975; Kendrick 1961Chart 4
Model Predictions With an Investment Wedge




















*The output and investment series are detrended by 1.6 pecent per year.
 The output and labor series are shown relative to their 1929 values (1929=100);
 the investment series, as a percentage of 1929 output.
 Sources of basic data: U.S. Commerce, various dates and 1975; Kendrick 1961